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IF WOMEN DON'T ASK: IMPLICATIONS FOR 
BARGAINING ENCOUNTERS:-,THE EQUAL 
PAY ACT, AND TITLJ!; VII 
Charles B. Craver* 
WOMEN DON'T ASK: NEGOTIATION AND THE GENDER DIVIDE. By 
Linda Babcock and Sara Laschever. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press. 2003. Pp. xii, 223. $24.95. 
Last spring, Jennifer and Richard graduated from the same law 
school with similar backgrounds. Both were offered associate positions 
with the same law firm with a $75,000 starting salary. Jennifer 
enthusiastically accepted the firm's offer, but Richard was hesitant. He 
informed the hiring partner that comparable firms in this area were 
paying new associates $80,000 per year. The partner offered Richard a 
starting salary of $80,000, which he accepted. 
Felicia and Harold manage similar departments for an e-commerce 
business. They have similar backgrounds, and have been with this firm 
for the same number of years. When Harold meets with the CEO to 
review his recent performance, the CEO gives him a "superior" rating, 
and offers him a $10,000 salary increase. Harold notes that his 
departmental sales went up 10% over the past twelve months and 
indicates that he thinks he should receive a more substantial increase. 
The CEO praises Harold for his initiative and confidence, and agrees 
to a $20,000 increase. Two days later, Felicia meets with the CEO to 
review her performance. The CEO gives her a "superior" rating, and 
offers her a $10,000 salary increase. Felicia notes that her 
departmental sales have increased 20% over the past year and 
requests a more generous increase. The CEO indicates that he has 
always found her a bit pushy and self-centered. He encourages her to 
develop her "feminine side" and be "more lady-like." He then says 
that if she wants an increase of more than $10,000, she should look for 
work elsewhere. 
INTRODUCTION 
For many years, the annual earnings of women working full-time 
have lagged behind the earnings of men working full-time.1 Until the 
* Freda H. Alverson Professor of Law, George Washington University. B.S. 1967, M. 
Indus. & Lab. Rel. 1968, Cornell; J.D. 1971, Michigan - Ed. 
1. See RANDALLK. FILER ET AL., THE ECONOMICS OF WORK AND PAY 560-73 (1996). 
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last two decades, women earned about 60% of what their male cohorts 
earned. Although this gender gap has narrowed in recent years to 
approximately 80%2 as many women have entered traditionally male 
occupations, the wage gap remains significant. Some of this 
differential is caused by the continued concentration of women in 
traditionally female occupations, and the fact that women are more 
likely than men to take time out from paid work to take care of 
parental obligations.3 But much of this difference is due to the 
reluctance of women to believe that they deserve more, and the 
hesitancy of females to use their bargaining skills to obtain greater 
salary increases. It may also reflect the concern of women that they 
will be evaluated negatively if they contradict stereotyped supervisory 
expectations and behave too much like their male colleagues. 
In their new book, Women Don't Ask: Negotiation and the Gender 
Divide ("Women Don't Ask"), Linda Babcock4 and Sara Laschever5 
thoughtfully explore relevant gender-based stereotypes and the 
reluctance of women to negotiate more advantageous employment 
terms for themselves. The detailed empirical research discussed by 
Babcock and Laschever explains why females feel less comfortable in 
bargaining contexts than their male cohorts. The authors also discuss 
ways in which women can overcome these gender-based inhibitions. 
To the extent women undervalue their services and are hesitant to 
negotiate more generous employment conditions, they may place 
themselves at a disadvantage vis-a-vis male colleagues who perform 
substantially equal work. When employers permit these gender-based 
compensation differentials to exist, they expose themselves to liability 
under the Equal Pay Act.6 Unless employers can establish that the 
differentials are based upon one of the four statutory exceptions,7 they 
may be held liable for back pay, an equal amount of liquidated 
damages, and attorney fees.8 
2 See Wage Gap Between Men, Women Persists, But GAO Says Reasons for Difference 
Unclear, DAILY LAB. REP. (Bureau of National Affairs) Nov. 21, 2003, at A-6. 
' See RANDALL K. FILER & DANIEL S. HAMERMESH, THE ECONOMICS OF 
WORK AND PAY 560-73 (1996). 
4. James M. Walton Professor of Economics, H. John Heinz III School of Public Policy 
and Management, Carnegie Mellon University. 
5. Freelance writer. 
6. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2000). The Equal Pay Act prohibits compensation differentials 
based upon gender for persons performing jobs that require equal effort, skill, and 
responsibility under similar working conditions. Id. 
7. The Equal Pay Act excepts pay differences that are based upon: (1) a seniority 
system; (2) a merit system; (3) a system measuring earnings by the quantity or quality of 
production; or ( 4) any factor other than sex. Id. 
8. See id. § 216(b). In order to comply with the Equal Pay Act, the employer must raise 
the compensation of the lower paid worker to that of the higher paid worker. See id. § 
206(d). 
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Gender-based stereotypes may also expose employers to potential 
liability under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.9 If firms are 
aware of the reluctance of women to negotiate higher salaries for 
themselves and deliberately choose to pay male employees more for 
work of comparable worth, they may contravene Title VII's sex 
discrimination prohibition. In addition, subconscious sex-related 
behavioral role expectations that cause similarly situated men and 
women to be judged differently may create other Title VII problems. 
In Part I, this Review will explore the empirical studies discussed 
in Woman Don't Ask and evaluate the impact of those research 
findings on male and female bargaining encounters. Part II will then 
examine Equal Pay Act issues that may arise because of the hesitancy 
of women to seek compensation levels commensurate with those of 
their male cohorts. Finally, Part III will discuss ways in which different 
gender-based stereotypes may raise substantial Title VII issues with 
respect to women whose behavior contradicts societal expectations. 
I. GENDER AND BARGAINING INTERACTIONS 
When Linda Babcock was director of her Ph.D. program at 
Carnegie Mellon University, she discovered that the starting salaries 
of male graduates were 7.6% higher than those for female graduates 
(p. 1). She endeavored to determine the reason for this differential 
and found that while 57% of men asked for more money when they 
received job offers, only 7% of women did so (p. 1). The graduates 
who negotiated their starting salaries increased their initial offers by 
7.4% (p. 2). She noted that most employers actually expect new hires 
to bargain over their initial employment terms and could not 
understand why more women were not willing to do so (p. 8). While 
young boys are taught to ask for what they want, young girls are 
taught to focus more on the needs of others (p. 11). Men are expected 
to be bold and even aggressive when advancing their own interests, 
while women are supposed to behave modestly and unselfishly (p. 11 ). 
She also noted that even when females do negotiate their initial terms 
of employment, they tend to obtain less beneficial salaries than males, 
because women generally ask for less and have lower personal 
expectations (pp. 11-12). 
Babcock wanted to learn more about the reluctance of women to 
negotiate and the hesitancy of females who do ask for more to seek as 
much as their male colleagues. She initially used a "turnip-to-oyster" 
scale which measured the propensity of people to think they can 
change their own circumstances. She and her colleagues found that 
females are 45% more likely than males to achieve low scores on this 
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to 2000e-17 (2000). 
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scale, indicating that they do not believe they can modify their 
personal situations (pp. 19-20). She then employed a "locus-of­
control" scale designed to determine whether test takers think they 
exercise meaningful control over their own circumstances, and 
discovered that males are far more likely to believe they can control 
their own destinies than women.10 
Studies pertaining to the acculturation process for boys and girls 
help to explain many of the gender-based differences Babcock found. 
Boys are brought up to believe they can control their own lives, while 
girls are taught they exercise less control over their personal situations 
(p. 29). When parents assign chores to young sons and daughters, they 
tend to assign more independent tasks to boys than to girls (p. 29). 
Parents generally feel that girls are more vulnerable than boys, and 
they are more protective of their daughters than their sons (p. 30). 
Girls tend to play more structured games that teach them compliant 
behavior, while boys tend to play less-structured games that encourage 
more-independent behavior (pp. 34-35). 
In Chapter 2, Babcock and Laschever explore empirical ·studies 
indicating that females tend to expect lower salaries than their male 
cohorts (pp. 41-61). As children, girls are usually asked to perform 
housekeeping chores (cleaning, cooking, and dish washing) for which 
they receive no monetary rewards, while boys tend to perform 
external tasks (lawn mowing and car washing) for which they receive 
cash payments (p. 47). As a result, when males and females enter the 
regular labor force, males expect greater compensation than do 
females who tend to compare their salaries only with those earned by 
other women rather than to the higher salaries received by men (pp. 
54-55). 
Societal expectations for males and females differ greatly. "Men 
are thought to be assertive, dominant, decisive, ambitious, and self­
oriented, whereas women are thought to be warm, expressive, 
nurturing, emotional, and friendly" (p. 62). Due to their other­
oriented upbringings, females find it more difficult to ask for things for 
themselves than their self-oriented male cohorts (p. 63). Babcock and 
Laschever cite "pay-allocation" studies indicating that females expect 
less pay for the same work, and expect to work for longer periods for 
the same compensation, than do males (p. 64). 
Men and women continue to be employed in traditionally male 
and female occupations. The vast majority of child-care workers, 
elementary-school teachers, nurses, secretaries, and social workers are 
women, while the vast majority of corporate officers, engineers, 
construction workers, and financial managers are men (p. 65). Much of 
10. P. 23. Women are more likely to believe that life is fair and that they will get what 
they deserve, while men tend to think that they must act to obtain their just rewards. P. 33. 
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this gender-based occupational segregation is attributable to the 
acculturation process. Most of the characters on Saturday morning 
children's television programs are male, and the majority of action 
figures in computer games are male (p. 70). Boys play with action toys, 
and girls play with dolls and kitchen equipment designed to inculcate 
care-giving skills (p. 70). Despite societal changes over the past several 
decades, recent studies of undergraduate students have found that 
men and women continue to have strong gender-based role 
expectations (p. 75). 
Boys are raised to have a sense of entitlement - they deserve 
what they earn - while girls are implicitly taught that they do not 
deserve very much (pp. 51-54). As a result, girls develop the "imposter 
syndrome" which causes them to question their ability to perform well 
in male-dominated fields (pp. 77-78). Babcock and Laschever draw 
upon the work of Claude Steele to explore the impact of "stereotype 
threat" which demonstrates that women tend to perform below their 
true levels of competency when asked to perform tasks they think are 
male-oriented.11 The authors suggest that since many people think of 
bargaining as a male task, stereotype threat may cause female 
negotiators to perform less well than they would if they considered 
bargaining interactions to be gender-neutral endeavors (p. 81). 
Babcock and Laschever explore empirical studies suggesting that 
women feel less comfortable with overt competition than men, based 
upon the fact that boys are brought up to be competitive while girls 
are not (pp. 102-03). Girls are raised to believe that if they are openly 
competitive, they will find it difficult to attract boys (p. 103). This may 
help to explain why males feel more comfortable using a "dominant 
style" when trying to persuade others, while women feel more 
comfortable employing a "submissive style" (p. 105). These studies 
indicate the degree to which societal gender-based expectations 
influence the different ways we think men and women should behave 
in similar situations (pp. 106-07). These expectations may affect 
negotiating styles, with males expected to behave more competitively 
and women expected to behave more cooperatively. 
In Chapters 5, 6, and 7, Babcock and Laschever focus specifically 
on two phenomena that may significantly influence negotiation 
encounters: (1) the reluctance of women to ask for benefits for 
themselves and (2) the lower aspirations held by many females. The 
authors note that, 2.5 times as many women than men feel substantial 
apprehension when they are required to negotiate and make the 
demands associated with the bargaining process (p. 1 14). Women 
question their competence as negotiators, and they fear that such 
1 1 .  Pp. 79-81. See generally Claude M. Steele, A Threat in the Air: How Stereotypes 
Shape Intellectual Identity and Performance, 52 AM. PSYCHOL. 613 (1997). 
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competitive encounters may threaten existing relationships (pp. 1 16-
17). Males think of bargaining situations as ways to advance their 
interests, but females view such settings negatively (pp. 118-19). These 
different perspectives reflect the fact that boys have been raised to 
welcome competitive situations, while girls have been brought up to 
value cooperation and the avoidance of conflict (p. 120). 
When men and women negotiate, males often obtain more 
beneficial results than females (pp. 130-31). Babcock and Laschever 
attribute these differences to the direct correlation between negotiator 
aspiration levels and bargaining outcomes, and the fact that males 
tend to establish higher goals than females (pp. 137-39). Male 
negotiators are more comfortable accepting the risk of nonsettlement, 
while more risk-averse females fear such stalemates (pp. 138-39). Men 
also tend to exude a greater confidence when they negotiate than do 
women (pp. 140-41). 
In Chapter 7, Babcock and Laschever cite empirical studies 
indicating that people expect men to achieve better results when they 
negotiate than women. They note Ian Ayres' car-dealer study finding 
that car salespeople offer better deals to males than to females. 1 2  
When subjects play the "ultimatum game," in which participants have 
to propose to other subjects ways to divide set sums of money, offerors 
expect females to accept less generous divisions than males (pp. 149-
50). 
Babcock and Laschever do an excellent job of explaining why 
women may feel less comfortable in bargaining environments than 
men and why they may not achieve results as beneficial as those men 
receive. They do not, however, discuss as thoroughly factors that 
might cause women to be more effective than men with respect to 
competitive bargaining interactions. For the past thirty years, I have 
taught legal-negotiation courses in which students explore the 
negotiation stages, verbal and nonverbal communication, negotiator 
styles, bargaining techniques, and other relevant factors. 13 The 
students are required to engage in a series of negotiation exercises, the 
results of which determine two-thirds of their course grade.14 Women 
feel less comfortable with the overt competition indigenous to my 
course structure than men, based upon personal comments I have 
12. Pp. 148-49. See generally Ian Ayers & Peter Siegelman, Race and Gender 
Discrimination in Bargaining for a New Car, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 304 (1995). 
13. See CHARLES B. CRAVER, E FFECTIVE LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SEITLEMENT 
(4th ed. 2001) [hereinafter CRAVER, EFFECTIVE LEGAL NEGOTIATION]; see also CHARLES 
CRAVER, THE INTELLIGENT NEGOTIATOR (2002). 
14. The other one-third is based upon a ten- to fifteen-page paper students must prepare 
examining different aspects of bargaining interactions. 
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received from students and the fact that 38.8% of women take my 
course on a credit/no-credit basis while only 26.7% of men do so.15 
Over the years, I have endeavored to determine which factors 
influence bargaining outcomes. I kve found no statistically significant 
correlation between student GPAs when they graduate and 
negotiation exercise results.1 6 GPAs reflect abstract reasoning skills, 
while negotiation performance reflects interpersonal skills - what 
Daniel Goleman likes to call "emotional intelligence."17 If we do raise 
girls to be more attune to inter-personal relationships than boys, this 
factor should help females achieve more beneficial negotiation 
outcomes. Studies also show that women are typically better readers 
of nonverbal signals than men,18 which should be a critical factor with 
respect to bargaining encounters in which more than half of the 
communication is nonverbal.19 
When men negotiate, they tend to use direct language to support 
their positions, but women are more likely to employ indirect 
language.20 Although this communicational difference might induce 
others to perceive male negotiators as more forceful than fem ale 
negotiators, this impact may be counterbalanced by a related factor. 
The directness of men may alert opponents to their overtly 
competitive objectives, while the indirect style of females may induce 
some opponents to lower their guard expecting less competitive 
interactions. 
Despite empirical studies finding gender-based differences 
between male and female high-school and undergraduate students, 
studies have also found that greater educational attainment reduces 
male-female differences.21 Specific training in negotiation courses, 
15. See Charles B. Craver & David W. Barnes, Gender, Risk Taking, and Negotiation 
Performance, 5 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 299, 331-33 (1999); see also id. at 312-13 (citing 
relevant studies). 
16. See Charles B. Craver, The Impact of Student GPAs and a Pass/Fail Option on 
Clinical Negotiation Course Performance, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 373 (2000) ; see 
also Charles B. Craver, The Impact of a Pass/Fail Option on Negotiation Course 
Performance, 48 J. LEGAL EDUC. 176, 183 (1998) (finding that students taking the course for 
a letter grade achieve significantly better negotiation exercise results than students taking 
the course on a credit/no-credit basis). 
17. See generally DANIEL GOLEMAN, EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE (1995) ; DANIEL 
GOLEMAN, WORKING WITH EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE (1998). 
18. See JUDITH A. HALL, NONVERBAL SEX DIFFERENCES: COMMUNICATION, 
ACCURACY AND EXPRESSIVE STYLE 15-17, 27 (1984); NANCY M. HENLEY, BODY POLITICS: 
POWER, SEX, AND NONVERBAL COMMUNICATION 13-15 (1977). 
19. See PETER B. STARK & JANE FLAHERTY, THE ONLY NEGOTIATING GUIDE YOU'LL 
EVER NEED 45 (2003) . 
20. See DEBORAH TANNEN, TALKING FROM 9 To 5, at 78-106 (1994) . 
21. See Larry R. Smeltzer & Kittie W. Watson, Gender Differences in Verbal 
Communication During Negotiations, 3 COMM. RES. REP. 74, 77-78 (1986); see also 
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including work on bargaining exercises, should further diminish male­
female differences as participants learn the most effective ways to 
advance their goals. 
During the first few weeks of each negotiation course, I give 
students a practice exercise in which I ask them to record their 
bargaining objectives before they begin to interact with their 
opponents. When I graph the negotiation results against pre­
bargaining aspiration levels, students see a direct correlation between 
negotiator aspiration levels and negotiation outcomes. This is designed 
to convince students of the importance of elevated expectations. I also 
try to make students feel comfortable with the notion they should not 
be embarrassed when they use ethical tactics to obtain beneficial 
results for their own side. 
Individuals who teach negotiation courses should always explore 
perceived gender differences and their possible impact on bargaining 
interactions. Both male and female students should appreciate the 
potential impact of gender-based stereotypes, and learn how to 
diminish the influence of such factors. As students work on 
subsequent negotiation exercises, they can learn the importance of 
firm aspirations and the use of persuasive language. 
Do male and female students achieve different results on my Legal 
Negotiation course exercises? I have found no statistically significant 
differences.22 This indicates that well-educated and specially trained 
students should be able to overcome any differences one might expect 
to find due to gender-based role expectations. 
Babcock and Laschever focus primarily upon two critical factors 
causing women to accept lower salaries than their male cohorts. First, 
the hesitancy of females to request greater compensation levels when 
they are offered employment opportunities. Second, the tendency of 
women to undervalue the true worth of their services. College 
professors and parents need to teach both males and females that 
employers generally expect persons to negotiate their initial terms of 
employment when they are offered new jobs.23 Once employment 
offers have been tendered, the recipients of those offers should 
politely ask if the offering firms would consider more generous 
compensation. Most will indicate that they would be amenable to such 
a discussion and ultimately offer higher starting salaries or more 
expansive fringe benefits. 
DEBORAH TANNEN, You JUST DON'T UNDERSTAND 235-38 (1990) (indicating that when 
women interact with men, they tend to adopt male norms). 
22. See Craver & Barnes, supra note 15, at 343-44 tbl.6. 
23. See ROBIN L. PINKLEY & GREGORY B. NORTHCRAFT, GET PAID WHAT YOU'RE 
WORTH 3-5 (2000). 
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Professors and parents must also teach females that they are worth 
as much as their male cohorts in the employment world. Women 
should not judge their worth by what females - especially those in 
traditionally female occupations - are paid. They should be 
encouraged to ascertain the salary levels for men and expect 
commensurate compensation. This would persuade female applicants 
to raise their aspiration levels and induce them to negotiate more 
beneficial employment terms. 
After spending seven chapters explaining why women tend to 
obtain less beneficial negotiating results than men, Babcock and 
Laschever use Chapter 8 to soften the impact of their findings. They 
cite the trend away from win-lose, competitive, positional bargaining 
toward win-win, interest-based bargaining.24 They suggest that 
contemporary negotiation experts are more interested in the 
achievement of greater joint gains than the attainment of personal 
gains, and assert that the female emphasis on relationships and 
cooperative bargaining should enhance this new negotiation approach. 
It is undoubtedly true that self-oriented, win-lose negotiators who 
only care about the maximization of their own returns often do not do 
as well as they might have done through interest-based bargaining. 
They place undue emphasis on positions, pay minimal attention to 
opponent needs, and frequently assume a fixed-pie to be divided. If 
they used the Preparation Stage to ascertain the underlying needs and 
interests of their own side25 and the Information Stage to determine 
the underlying needs and interests of the opposing side,26 they could 
achieve more beneficial results. They could look for ways to expand 
the pie to be divided through such things as in-kind payments or 
structured settlements, and they could determine how to maximize 
opponent gains at minimal costs to their own side. 
Can all bargaining issues be resolved in a win-win fashion? 
Generally not in the business and legal worlds. In almost all such 
bargaining interactions, there will be distributive items that are highly 
valued by both sides.27 These are the terms the parties will fight about. 
Starting salaries are a perfect example. Either the new employee will 
obtain more beneficial terms or the employer will save money that can 
be used elsewhere. If women - and men - are taught to be more 
accommodating when they negotiate, they will concede too much to 
competitive opponents. 
24. Pp. 164-79. See generally ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM DRY, GETTING To YES (1981); 
ROBERT H. MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING (2000). 
25. See CRAVER, EFFECTIVE LEGAL NEGOTIATION, supra note 13, at 61-91. 
26. See id. at 107-41. 
27. See generally Gerald B. Wetlaufer, The Limits of Integrative Bargaining, 85 GEO. 
L.J. 369 (1996). 
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In their book, The Power of Nice,28 Ron Shapiro and Mark 
Jankowski talk about their real-world views of Getting to Yes 
bargaining. "If someone is going to come out ahead, our aim is to 
make sure that someone is you. That's WIN-win. Both parties win, but 
you win bigger."29 I develop their theme in my own book when I 
discuss the "competitive/problem-solving" style, which encourages 
negotiators to first seek to advance their own side's interests and then 
work to maximize the joint returns achieved by both sides.30 Both 
Gerald Williams, in the early 1980s, and Andrea Kupfer Schneider, in 
the late 1990s, conducted similar empirical studies pertaining to the 
negotiating styles of lawyers. Although they found more 
cooperative/problem-solvers to be "effective" negotiators than 
competitive/adversarials and far more competitive/adversarials to be 
"ineffective" bargainers than cooperative/problem-solvers,31 they 
found a common characteristic among most effective negotiators from 
both groups. The bargainers want to maximize their own side's 
results.32 This suggests that even people characterized as 
cooperative/problem-solvers should more realistically be considered 
competitive/problem-solvers. 
The most proficient negotiators are thoroughly prepared, have 
established firm, beneficial aspiration levels, and wish to obtain 
advantageous results for their own side. To the extent Babcock and 
Laschever - and others - encourage women to be more 
accommodating and less goal-oriented, they further traditional 
gender-based stereotypes and place the persons who follow this 
approach at a distinct disadvantage. If they are open with their 
confidential information when more manipulative opponents are not 
being so forthright and if they become so concerned about the need to 
satisfy opponent needs that they forget to strive for optimal results for 
themselves, they are likely to achieve less beneficial outcomes for 
themselves. I would have been more enthusiastic about a substitute 
chapter that would seek to teach females how to be more comfortable 
with the competition inherent in most commercial bargaining 
encounters and to believe that it is perfectly acceptable to obtain 
generous results for oneself.33 By redefining negotiation success to 
28. RONALD M. SHAPIRO & MARK A. JANKOWSKI, THE POWER OF NICE (2001). 
29. Id. at 45. 
30. See CRAVER, EFFECTIVE LEGAL NEGOTIATION, supra note 13, at 19-22. 
31. See GERALD R. WILLIAMS, LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SEITLEMENT 19 (1983); 
Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Shattering Negotiation Myths: Empirical Evidence on the 
Effectiveness of Negotiation Style, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 143, 167 (2002). 
32. See WILLIAMS, supra note 31, at 27; Schneider, supra note 31, at 188. 
33. See generally LEE E. MILLER & JESSICA MILLER, A WOMAN'S GUIDE TO 
SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATING (2002). See also DEBORAH M. KOLB & JUDITH WILLIAMS, THE 
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emphasize pure win-win results, they encourage continued female 
behavior that will cause women to defer to the more competitive 
demands of male opponents. This will be especially true when they 
have to interact with manipulative opponents who use the 
competitive/problem-solving style to advance their own interests 
ahead of those of the other side. 
II. EQUAL PAY ACT IMPLICATIONS 
In the early 1960s, the average income of full-time females was 
about 60% of the income received by full-time males.34 In 1963, 
Congress decided to address this disparity by enacting the Equal Pay 
Act ("EPA") amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act 
("FLSA").3 5 The EPA makes it unlawful for an employer to 
discriminate: 
between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees ... 
at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the 
opposite sex ... for equal work on jobs the performance of which 
requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed 
under similar working conditions. 3 6  
Once a claimant demonstrates the existence of a gender-based 
compensation differential with respect to work that is substantially 
equal,37 the employer may avoid liability only by showing that the 
differential is based upon: (1) a seniority system; (2) a merit system; 
(3) a system measuring earnings by the quantity or quality of 
production; or (4) any other factor other than sex.38 
The EPA is enforced through the regular FLSA enforcement 
procedures. Individuals may bring civil actions under section 16(b )39 
seeking back pay for the difference between the claimant's lower 
salary and the male employee's higher salary, and the statute expressly 
requires the lower rate of compensation be raised to that of the higher 
paid worker.40 The claimant can also obtain an equal amount as 
SHADOW NEGOTIATION: How WOMEN CAN MASTER THE HIDDEN AGENDAS THAT 
DETERMINE BARGAINING SUCCESS (2000). 
34. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text. 
35. Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (1963). The EPA is set forth in 
section 6(d) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2000). 
36. 29 u.s.c. § 206(d)(l) (2000). 
37. See, e.g., Thompson v. Sawyer, 678 F.2d 257, 272-73 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Shultz v. 
Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259, 265 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 905 (1970). 
38. 29 u.s.c. § 206(d)(l) (2000). 
39. 29 u.s.c. § 216(b) (2000). 
40. See id. § 206(d). 
May 2004) If Women Don't Ask 1115 
liquidated damages and an award of attorney fees.4 1 If the employer 
can establish that the EPA violation was due to action taken in good 
faith and with reasonable grounds for believing that it did not 
contravene the EPA, the court may reduce or eliminate the liquidated 
damage portion of any award.42 
Employer motivation is irrelevant with respect to EPA liability.43 
To establish an EPA violation, a female claimant need not prove that 
all or most males are being paid more than she is; she only has to find 
a single male performing equal work who is receiving greater 
compensation.44 Even if the claimant occupies a unique position that 
differs from the jobs of her coworkers, this does not ipso facto 
preclude a possible EPA claim. If she can show that her male 
predecessor or male replacement performed the same job but received 
higher pay, she may challenge her reduced compensation.45 
It is important to acknowledge the narrow scope of EPA coverage. 
It only applies to gender-based compensation differentials pertaining 
to individuals performing substantially equal work. If males 
performing certain job tasks are paid more than females performing 
different job tasks, there would be no EPA liability.46 As a result, to 
the extent women enter lower-paying female occupations and men 
enter higher-paying male occupations, the women would be unable to 
challenge the resulting compensation differentials under the EPA due 
to the lack of substantially equal jobs. 
Babcock and Laschever discuss situations directly affected by the 
EPA when they talk about the fact that far more men than women try 
to negotiate higher initial salaries when they receive offers of 
employment (p. 1). This partially explains why Babcock, in her study 
of Carnegie Mellon University graduates, found the starting pay levels 
for the males to be 7.6% higher than those for females. If an employer 
41. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("E.E.O.C.") may also sue the 
offending employer on the claimant's behalf and obtain back pay and liquidated damages on 
behalf of that person. See id. § 216( c ). 
42 See id. § 260. 
43. See, e.g., Tidwell v. Fort Howard Corp., 989 F.2d 406, 409 (10th Cir. 1993); Hodgson 
v. Am. Bank of Commerce, 447 F.2d 416, 423 (5th Cir. 1971). 
44. Although the EPA expressly prohibits gender-based "wage" differentials, the 
E.E.O.C. has taken the position that the term "wages" includes all forms of compensation, 
including fringe benefits. See 29 C.F.R. § 1620.10 (2003); see also, e.g., Laffey v. Northwest 
Airlines, Inc., 642 F.2d 578, 586-88 (D.C. Cir. 1980). If most similarly situated males are 
being paid the same amount as the claimant who is basing her case upon one or two higher­
paid males, the employer may be able to show that the greater compensation levels for those 
workers falls within one of the statutory exceptions. 
45. See, e.g., Dey v. Colt Constr. & Dev. Co., 28 F.3d 1446, 1461-62 (7th Cir. 1994); 
Sinclair v. Auto. Club of Okla., Inc., 733 F.2d 726, 729 (10th Cir. 1984). 
46. Any challenge to pay differentials pertaining to different jobs would have to be 
brought under Title VII. See infra Part IV.A. 
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were to succumb to male bargaining entreaties with respect to jobs 
that are substantially equal to those of women who do not ask about 
the possibility of more advantageous employment terms, the women 
would have claims under the EPA. This is the exact situation the 
enactment was designed to proscribe - the willingness of females to 
work for less based upon the "outmoded belief that a man . . .  should 
be paid more than a woman, even though his duties are the same. "47 
No defense would be available to the employer, because the pay 
differential would not be based upon seniority differences, a merit 
system, a system measuring the quantity or quality of production, or 
any other non-gender-related factor. If the employer thinks the higher 
salary given to males is appropriate for the position, it should provide 
the same compensation to women - even if they failed to take the 
initiative and request more beneficial terms. The only exception would 
be where the male has received another offer from a different firm 
and asks this employer to match that offer. When a company agrees to 
pay one employee more to match an actual offer received by that 
person from another firm, courts generally treat the resulting wage 
differential between this individual and his or her colleagues as a 
reflection of that person's market worth and regard it as a "factor 
other than sex"48 - so long as there is no indication that the firm only 
matches external offers received by men but not by women.49 
A similar issue arises when a company hires people already 
employed by other firms and considers the salaries they are receiving 
with their present employers when deciding the compensation to give 
to them. Courts have held that this practice assumes that the different 
salaries being earned by these individuals with their current firms 
reflect their actual market values and thus constitute a factor other 
than sex.50 The fact that this factor may favor males who are more 
likely to have negotiated more generous compensation packages with 
their present employers than their female cohorts does not prevent 
these courts from applying the "other-than-sex" exception. Even if 
courts were to ignore this "women-don't-ask" factor, they should 
appreciate the fact that this approach also extends the impact of 
gender-based differentials generated by the traditional under-valuing 
of women's work, but they do not believe that firms hiring new 
employees should be held responsible for the continued wage 
differences associated with this salary-setting practice. 
47. 5 Rep. No 176, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1963), quoted in Corning Glass Works v. 
Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195 (1974). 
48. See Homer v. Mary Inst., 613 F.2d 706, 714-15 (8th Cir. 1980). 
49. See Winkes v. Brown Univ., No. 80-0234B, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15200 (D.R.I. July 
26, 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 747 F.2d 792 (1st Cir. 1984). 
50. See Hodgson v. Robert Hall Clothes, Inc., 473 F.2d 589, 594-96 (3d Cir. 1973). 
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When employers provide male employees with larger current 
salaries either to match offers they have received from other firms or 
because of the higher present salaries they are being paid by different 
companies, how long may these differentials continue? If male and 
female employees are performing substantially equal work and have 
received comparable evaluations during their employment with the 
same employer, how long would a continued compensation 
differential based upon prior market considerations constitute a factor 
other than sex? I have never found a case resolving this question, but 
would think that after the passage of a reasonable period of time, the 
current employer of these individuals should have to make its own 
independent determination of their true worth. If they are found to be 
equal in this regard, their employer should have to raise the salary of 
the lower wage person to that of the higher wage individual. If the 
differential were maintained indefinitely, the lower-paid female would 
have the right to believe that her lower salary is no longer based upon 
gender-neutral market factors. 
The Babcock and Laschever findings raise a related problem. 
What happens if male and female employees have been with the same 
firm for a number of years performing substantially equal work, and a 
number of males negotiate greater pay increases than their more 
docile female colleagues? Would the resulting compensation 
differentials be lawful under the EPA? If the sole determining factor 
were the greater tendency of men to request more generous pay 
increases, the employer should not be permitted to maintain the 
compensation differences. These differentials would reflect two 
gender-based factors. First, the hesitancy of females to request greater 
incomes, and, second, the demonstrated willingness of women to 
undervalue their services. These considerations are the precise reasons 
Congress enacted the EPA. Unless an employer can establish more 
than a willingness of women to accept the devaluation of their worth, 
the firm should be obliged to raise the female compensation levels to 
those of their male cohorts. The only way the men should be able to 
obtain greater compensation in such situations should be where they 
have actually received more generous job offers from other companies 
and their employer agrees to match those offers to retain their 
services. 
The Babcock and Laschever findings should cause judges to 
examine salary differentials based upon external offers carefully. If 
men are more likely than women to explore other employment 
opportunities and to use those circumstances to negotiate greater 
compensation increases from their current employer, it would be 
difficult to maintain that their exalted pay levels are due to market­
based factors unrelated to gender-based considerations. Nonetheless, I 
think that many judges would find these practices lawful - at least 
where the company does not continue the resulting differentials 
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indefinitely for males and females who are performing equal work and 
who have comparable performance evaluations. 
III. TITLE VII IMPLICATIONS 
The Babcock and Laschever findings also raise two critical issues 
under Title VII, which prohibits employment discrimination based 
upon race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Even when males 
and females are not performing jobs that are substantially equal in 
terms of skill, effort, and responsibility, the tendency of employers to 
overvalue male work and to undervalue female work may create 
liability under Title VII. In addition, the possibility that employers 
may apply different criteria reflecting gender-based stereotypes when 
they evaluate the behavior of men and women may raise other Title 
VII concerns. What makes these cases especially problematic concerns 
the fact that while some supervisors may consciously apply different 
evaluative standards to males and females, other managers would be 
likely to apply different standards subconsciously without even 
realizing that differential treatment is occurring. 
A. Gender-Based Compensation Differentials 
Section 703(a)(l) of Title VII makes it an unlawful employment 
practice for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any 
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with 
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual's . . .  sex." 51 It is absolutely 
settled law that if an employer were to hire men and women to 
perform similar work and deliberately paid the females less than their 
male cohorts because of their gender, the firm would contravene Title 
VII's employment-discrimination prohibition. 52 Suppose an employer 
did not engage in such overt sex discrimination, but merely paid 
traditionally male jobs more than traditionally female jobs. Would 
such disparate treatment violate Title VII? 
Individuals may establish Title VII violations using either the 
discriminatory-treatment or the disparate-impact approach. Under the 
former, a claimant must show that he or she has been treated 
differently because of his or her sex - i.e., the employer was 
motivated by impermissible gender-based considerations. 53 The proof 
51. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (2000). 
52. Cf Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 394-97 (1986) (finding deliberate race-based 
compensation differentials to be unlawful). 
53. On rare occasions, gender may constitute a bona fide occupational qualification 
("BFOQ") for the positions in question. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2000). BFOQs are 
generally limited to positions that involve gender-based privacy considerations, such as 
fitting-room or bathroom attendants. 
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construct for these discriminatory treatment cases is divided into three 
stages. 54 The claimant must initially demonstrate that she applied for a 
position, met the stated qualifications, and was rejected. The burden 
of articulation - but not persuasion - then shifts to the employer to 
provide a nondiscriminatory explanation for the challenged action. 5 5  
Once this minimal burden is satisfied, the claimant has the burden to 
show that the stated employer justification is really a pretext for 
unlawful gender discrimination.5 6  
Suppose an employer does not pay men more than women to 
perform similar tasks on gender grounds alone, but instead identifies 
the jobs men and women have traditionally held, evaluates the 
economic values the jobs generate, and then decides to pay the men 
the full value of their positions, but the women only 70 or 75 % of the 
evaluated worth of their jobs. In County of Washington v. Gunther,57 
this is exactly what the county had done with respect to its male and 
female correctional workers. The lower courts found no EPA 
violation because of the meaningful differences in the job 
responsibilities involved. 58 The plaintiffs were thus forced to rely upon 
their Title VII claim. 
The county relied upon Section 703(h), which provides that "it 
shall not be an unlawful employment practice .. . for any employer to 
differentiate upon the basis of sex in determining the amount of the 
wages or compensation paid . . .  if such differentiation is authorized by 
the [Equal Pay Act]." 59 Since there was no EPA violation, the county 
asserted that there could be no Title VII violation. The Gunther Court 
rejected this contention, and held that this Title VII cross-reference 
did not immunize gender-based pay differentials that did not 
contravene the EPA solely because of the different job functions 
involved. This provision merely indicated that pay differences based 
upon seniority or merit systems, systems measuring the quantity or 
quality of production, or any other factor other than sex, that are 
excepted from EPA coverage, are similarly exempted under Title 
VII.60 
The Gunther Court carefully noted that the challenged county 
compensation scheme did not involve the "controversial concept of 
54. Cf McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973) (setting out the 
test for establishing a prima facie case of Title VII racial discrimination). 
55. See Texas Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981). 
56. Cf Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 141-49 (2000) 
(clarifying the pretext-stage burden in an age-discrimination case). 
57. 452 U.S. 161 (1981). 
58. See Gunther, 452 U.S. at 165. 
59. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (2000). 
60. See Gunther, 452 U.S. at 167-80. 
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'comparable worth' under which plaintiffs might claim increased 
compensation on the basis of a comparison of the intrinsic worth or 
difficulty of their job with that of other jobs in the same 
organization." 61 It instead concerned a claim that the county had 
deliberately chosen to underpay the female guards following a job­
valuation study performed by an outside firm at the county's own 
request. The Court held that employers that evaluate the relative 
economic values of different jobs and intentionally choose to 
underpay certain positions because of the gender of the employees 
performing those jobs may be held liable under Title VII. 
Suppose the job valuations are not performed by the employer, but 
are instead conducted by firm employees or an external civil-rights 
organization on the workers' behalf. If the results of this study indicate 
that the female-guard positions are worth as much as the male-guard 
positions but are being compensated at lower levels, would the female 
guards have a claim under Title VII? In AFSCME v. State,62 the Ninth 
Circuit carefully reviewed the Gunther holding and concluded that 
Title VII does not prohibit such market-based differentials, even 
though they may reflect societal undervaluing of female work. Unless 
claimants can demonstrate that their employer had the relative-worth 
evaluations conducted and deliberately elected to underpay the 
employees performing traditionally female work, no claim under Title 
VII could be maintained. 
Suppose female employees decide to challenge their employer's 
reliance upon prior salaries when establishing compensation levels for 
its new hires or its considerations of outside offers from other firms 
when deciding how much to increase the salaries of current 
employees. They cite the Babcock and Laschever findings that show 
that such practices tend to result in the underpaying of female 
workers. Unless they could show that the employer used these factors 
for the purpose of disadvantaging women employees because of their 
gender, the claimants could not prevail under the discriminatory­
treatment model. They would have to rely on the disparate-impact 
approach. 
In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,63 a unanimous Supreme Court held 
that Title VII not only prohibits intentional discrimination based on 
an impermissible factor, but also proscribes reliance upon facially 
neutral factors that have a disparate effect on protected groups. 
"Under the Act, practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, 
and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they 
operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory employment 
61. Id. at 166. 
62. 770 F.2d 1401, 1404-06 (9th Cir. 1985). 
63. 401 U.S.424 (1971). 
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practices."64 As a result, the application of facially neutral standards 
that have a disproportionate impact upon women (and other protected 
groups) cannot be maintained, unless reliance upon those factors is job 
related and consistent with business necessity.65 The Supreme Court 
subsequently sought to modify the Griggs disparate-impact proof 
construct in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio66 by holding that 
employers could defend challenged practices by merely articulating 
nondiscriminatory business justifications for those techniques.67 
Congress statutorily reversed this portion of the Wards Cove Packing 
decision in the 1991 Civil Rights Act,68 when it added section 703{k) to 
Title VII to codify the prior Griggs approach. 
Under section 703(k), if a female claimant demonstrates that the 
application of a facially neutral employment practice has a disparate 
impact based upon sex, the employer can only continue to rely upon 
that factor if it can prove that the practice is "job related for the 
position in question and consistent with business necessity."69 If 
employer reliance upon previous salaries when it decides how much to 
pay new hires were to disadvantage females in a statistically significant 
way, the employer should be obliged under Title VII to show that its 
use of this factor is job related and consistent with business necessity. 
An employer would undoubtedly argue that this approach merely 
reflects market-based worth determinations over which it exercises no 
control. More conservative, law-and-economics-oriented judges would 
probably accept this rationale. They would suggest that employers 
must rationally endeavor to determine the "worth" of new employees 
and conclude that compensation levels with their immediate past 
employers provide prima facie evidence of their market values. If 
female claimants were similarly able to establish disparate impacts 
based upon their employer's practice of matching external offers 
received by its current employees, judges would most likely use 
analogous reasoning to sustain this practice. 
If the job-related nature of these compensation-setting practices 
were sustained, the claimants could only prevail if they could 
demonstrate the availability of equally predictive and less 
discriminatory techniques. Disadvantaged women could argue that 
64. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430; see also Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425-35 
(1975). 
65. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431. 
66. 490 U.S. 642 (1989). 
67. See Wards Cove Packing, 490 U.S. at 658-61. 
68. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, Title I, 105 Stat. 1074-76 (1991). 
69. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2000). If the employer establishes the requisite job 
relationship, the claimant can still prevail by showing that an equally predictive and less 
discriminatory alternative exists which the employer has failed to adopt. See id. § 2000e-
2(k)(l )(A)(ii). 
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firms should be required to make their own individualized assessments 
of employee worth without considering gender-biased market factors, 
but courts would be reluctant to impose such a burden on employers. 
Judges would most likely find that a person's immediate past salary -
or current offer from another firm - constitutes the most reliable 
indicator of that individual's present worth in the overall labor 
market.70 
So long as courts allow employers to consider market-based factors 
when making compensation decisions, women will continue to be 
disadvantaged. First, by the acknowledged fact that the employment 
market has historically overvalued male work and undervalued female 
work. Second, by the fact that Women Don't Ask. If more men bargain 
over their new salaries and are more likely to seek offers from other 
firms, if only to improve their salaries with their present employers, 
women will continue to be paid less than their male cohorts for work 
of comparable worth. 
B. Impact of Gender-Based Stereotyping 
In Women Don 't Ask, Babcock and Laschever focus on factors that 
cause females to accept lower compensation for their services than 
their male cohorts. While the reluctance of women to negotiate 
greater salaries constitutes a critical issue, the authors also discuss 
subtle gender-based stereotypes that raise different issues under Title 
VII. When male (and even female) managers evaluate subordinates, 
they frequently use male behavioral expectations to assess worker 
performance. Women (and men) who contradict these masculine role 
models are likely to receive lower ratings - even when their actual 
job performance is equal to or better than that of their more highly 
rated male colleagues. 
Many individuals expect men and women to behave in 
stereotypically different ways when they interact with others.71 Men 
are supposed to be rational and logical, while women are supposed to 
be emotional and intuitive.72 Males are expected to emphasize 
70. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text. 
71. See KAY DEAUX, THE BEHAVIOR OF MEN AND WOMEN (1976); CATHARINE A. 
MACKINNON, SEX EQUALITY 158-75 (2001); Mary F. Radford, Sex Stereotyping and the 
Promotion of Women to Positions of Power, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 471, 494-95 (1990); Susan 
Struth, Note, Permissible Sexual Stereotyping Versus Impermissible Sexual Stereotyping: A 
Theory of Causation, 34 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 679 (1989). See generally Linda Hamilton 
Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and 
Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995); Nadine Taub, Keeping 
Women in Their Place: Stereotyping Per Se as a Form of Employment Discrimination, 21 
B.C. L. REV. 345 (1980). 
72. See DEAUX, supra note 71, at 13; Sallyanne Payton, Releasing Excellence: Erasing 
Gender Zoning From the Legal Mind, 18 IND. L. REV. 629, 633 (1985). 
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objective fact, while females focus more on relationships.73 Men are 
supposed to define issues in abstract terms and to resolve them 
through the application of wholly rational principles.74 Males are 
expected to behave in dominant and authoritative ways, while females 
are supposed to behave more passively and submissively.75 
When men want something, they are likely to express their desires 
directly, while women tend to indicate their wishes indirectly.76 If a 
male supervisor wants a subordinate to do something, he is likely to 
tell that person exactly what he wants done. A female manager would 
be more likely to ask the subordinate if he or she would be willing to 
perform the requisite task. A subordinate understands that the direct 
male approach requires immediate action, while the same subordinate 
may not appreciate the imperative nature of the indirect female 
approach and may fail to carry out the requested work. 
Male and female self-concepts are influenced by the stereotypical 
ways in which others evaluate their performance. Men who perform 
traditionally masculine tasks no more proficiently than women tend to 
receive higher ratings.77 When men are successful, their performance 
tends to be attributed to intrinsic factors such as intelligence and hard 
work, but when women are successful, their performance is likely to 
be attributed to extrinsic factors such as easier circumstances or the 
assistance of others.78 This means that male success is overvalued, 
while female success is undervalued. 
When men and women encounter competitive situations, they tend 
to behave differently. Males, who have been raised since childhood to 
welcome overt competition and the opportunity to demonstrate their 
competence, look forward to these encounters. "[W]omen are more 
likely to avoid competitive situations, less likely to acknowledge 
competitive wishes, and not likely to do as well in competition."79 
Males tend to exude greater confidence than females in performance­
oriented circumstances. Even when they are only minimally prepared, 
73. See generally CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE {1982); Lee E. Teitelbaum 
et al., Gender, Legal Education, and Legal Careers, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 443, 446 {1991). 
74. See Project, Gender, Legal Education, and the Legal Profession: An Empirical Study 
of Stanford Law Students and Graduates, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1209, 1227 (1988). 
75. See ELEANOR EMMONS MACCOBY & CAROL NAGY JACKLIN, THE PSYCHOLOGY 
OF SEX DIFFERENCES 228, 234 (1974). 
76. See Lynn Smith-Lovin & Dawn T. Robinson, Gender and Conversational Dynamics, 
in GENDER, INTERACTION, AND INEQUALITY 122, 124-26 {Cecilia L. Ridgeway ed., 1992). 
77. See Martha Foschi, Gender and Double Standards for Competence, in GENDER, 
INTERACTION, AND INEQUALITY 181, 185 (Cecilia L. Ridgeway ed., 1992). 
78. See DEAUX, supra note 71, at 30-32, 41; Foschi, supra note 77, at 191. 
79. IRENE P. STIVER, WORK INHIBITIONS IN WOMEN 5 (Stone Ctr. for Developmental 
Servs. & Studies, Work in Progress Series No. 3, 1983); see pp. 102-03. 
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men think they can get through successfully.80 On the other hand, no 
matter how thoroughly prepared women are, they often feel 
unprepared. 81 
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins82 provides a perfect example of the 
impact of gender-based stereotyping on employment decisions. Ann 
Hopkins was a senior manager in the Washington, D.C. office of Price 
Waterhouse, and was the leading generator of firm business in that 
location. In 1982, she was the sole female among the eighty-eight 
persons proposed for partnership. Some of the partners thought she 
was overly aggressive and occasionally abrasive when she interacted 
with staff members.83 Evidence indicated that some of the negative 
reactions to Hopkins were gender-based. One partner described her as 
"macho," while another suggested that she "overcompensated for 
being a woman."84 One partner had advised Hopkins to "walk more 
femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make­
up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry," while another encouraged 
her to take "a course at charm school."8 5 
Dr. Susan Fiske, a social psychologist, testified that the partnership 
process had probably been influenced by sex stereotyping.86 The trial 
judge held that Price Waterhouse had illegally discriminated against 
Hopkins by consciously relying upon evaluations that reflected sex 
stereotyping.87 The Supreme Court sustained this conclusion. "In the 
specific context of sex stereotyping, an employer who acts on the basis 
of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, 
has acted on the basis of gender."88 The Court further recognized that 
" [i]n forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals because 
of their sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of 
disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex 
stereotypes."89 The Court also noted the double bind for women 
created by employers that expect females to act like men when 
80. See DANIEL GOLEMAN, WORKING WITH EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE 7 {1998). 
81. See GAIL EVANS, PLAY LIKE A MAN, WIN LIKE A WOMAN 84-85, 90-91 (2000); 
PEGGY MCINTOSH, FEELING LIKE A FRAUD (Stone Ctr. for Developmental Servs. & 
Studies, Work in Progress Series, No. 18 1985). 
82. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
83. See Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 234-35. 
84. Id. at 235. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. 
87. See id. at 237. 
88. Id. at 250. 
89. Id. at 251 (quoting Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 
707 n.13 {1978)) (alteration in original); see also Radford, supra note 71, at 500-03. 
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soliciting business, but to act like "ladies" when interacting with 
colleagues. 90 
In Women Don't Ask, Babcock and Laschever discuss the pressure 
on women not to intimidate their male colleagues (pp. 85-111). Male 
supervisors can directly tell subordinates what they want done, but 
female managers are expected to be less direct. Women have to be 
likeable if they wish to influence others (p. 87). These gender-based 
expectations explain why "women who use autocratic styles are judged 
less favorably than women who use democratic styles" (p. 89). 
Although the Hopkins Court did not explicitly discuss this issue, the 
reluctance of Price Waterhouse staff members to accept the 
managerial style of Hopkins probably reflected gender-based role 
expectations. The staff members accepted autocratic directives from 
male supervisors that they would not tolerate from female managers. 
They expected Hopkins to be more democratic and less direct. She 
should have asked them if they would do what she wanted instead of 
telling them what to do. 
Although the Hopkins Court appropriately recognized that 
employer reliance upon gender-based stereotypes may create liability 
under Title VII, it implicitly acknowledged the difficulty judges may 
have deciding which proof construct to apply to such cases. Since the 
trial court had expressly found that Price Waterhouse had consciously 
relied upon sex stereotypes when evaluating Hopkins' performance, it 
was clear that she had established a discriminatory treatment claim. 
She had been treated differently because of her gender. At another 
point in its opinion, however, the Court suggested the applicability of 
the disparate-impact proof construct with respect to other sex 
stereotype claims: 
Title VII even forbids employers to make gender an indirect stumbling 
block to employment opportunities. An employer may not ... condition 
employment opportunities on the satisfaction of facially neutral tests or 
qualifications that have a [disparate] impact on members of protected 
groups when those tests or qualifications are not required for 
performance of the job.91 
The Hopkins Court cited Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust,92 in 
which it had held that persons challenging subjective employment 
factors that affect men and women differently should use the 
disparate-impact approach. 
When employers consciously allow gender-based stereotypes to 
influence employment decisions, courts should clearly apply the 
90. See Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 251. 
91. Id. at 242. 
92. 487 U.S. 977 (1988). 
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discriminatory-treatment proof construct. This approach should be 
utilized with respect to cases in which the evidence indicates that firm 
officials knowingly applied different standards to men and women. 
For example, female employees told they are behaving too 
masculinely (or males told they are behaving too femininely). Women 
may be informed that they should not act too aggressively or use foul 
language, because such conduct is not "lady-like." Employers may 
refuse to employ women with young children93 or to assign late-night 
work to such females because they feel this would interfere with their 
parenting obligations or refuse to employ women in work 
environments that would expose them to substances that might affect 
their fetuses if they became pregnant.94 When employers tie expected 
behavioral norms to explicit sex stereotypes, it should be obvious that 
discriminatory treatment has occurred. So long as these considerations 
are found to have been "motivating factors,"95 Title VII liability 
should result.96 
What proof construct should be applied to employment decisions 
that may have been influenced by subconscious gender-based 
stereotyping? If the claimants had to prove deliberate sex 
discrimination, they would fail since the deciding persons were not 
actually motivated by overt consideration of gender. If the disparate­
impact approach were employed, however, statistical difficulties might 
arise. To establish prima facie cases, claimants would have to show 
that subconscious reliance on stereotyped expectations dispro­
portionately affected one gender. When only a few individuals have 
been disadvantaged by such practices, it would be difficult, if not 
impossible, for claimants to establish the requisite disparate impact.97 
These cases would involve circumstances in which supervisors 
provided some women with less generous evaluations because they 
failed to conform to gender-based expectations. They may have been 
more aggressive than these evaluators thought they should have been 
in situations in which equally aggressive males received positive 
ratings for their initiative and drive. The managers responsible for 
these different evaluations never thought in terms of gender and 
would be offended if such a suggestion were made. They were 
completely unaware of the subconscious gender-based stereotypes 
93. See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 543-44 (1971). 
94. See Auto. Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 197-207 (1991). 
95. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000). 
96. If the employer could prove that it would have taken the identical action had it not 
considered such gender-based factors, it would not avoid Title VII liability, but could 
eliminate back pay and other monetary relief. See id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). The claimant 
would still be entitled to injunctive relief and an award of attorney fees. 
97. If no disproportionate impact were established, the employer would not be required 
to demonstrate any job relatedness. See id. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(B)(ii). 
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influencing their judgments.98 Unless the number of females receiving 
lower evaluations because of these factors was significant, they would 
be unlikely to prevail under a disparate-impact theory. 
How should courts deal with subconscious sex stereotyping claims? 
They could endeavor to fit these cases within the traditional 
discriminatory-treatment model.99 They could examine the evaluative 
criteria used to rate candidates for different positions and allow social 
psychologists to testify which factors are particularly susceptible to 
gender-biased stereotyping. They could then permit jurors to infer the 
requisite discriminatory intent from the employer's reliance upon 
these factors.100 The difficulty with this approach would be the absence 
of any real evidence of deliberate sex-based motivation. Now that 
prevailing claimants in discriminatory-treatment cases may not only 
obtain back pay, but also compensatory and possibly punitive 
damages,101 it would be inappropriate to use a proof construct 
designed for intentional discrimination cases that effectively 
eliminated the deliberateness element. 
Courts could try to apply the disparate-impact model to these 
cases, but a prima facie case could only be established only where the 
same evaluative criteria have been applied to many employees and 
where numerous female claimants could demonstrate the existence of 
a disproportionate impact. Judges could circumvent this statistical 
impediment by allowing social psychologists, economists, and other 
experts to testify about the factors likely to have a negative effect due 
to the operation of subconscious gender-based stereotyping. The 
problem with this approach would concern the lack of statistical 
evidence showing that the use of these criteria has disproportionately 
affected women employed by the defendant firm. 
If neither the discriminatory-treatment nor the disparate-impact 
proof construct can reasonably be employed to challenge employer 
reliance on evaluative criteria that adversely affect women due to 
subconscious gender-based expectations, should the use of those 
factors remain unregulated under Title VII? In Griggs, the Supreme 
Court acknowledged that the objective of Congress when it enacted 
98. Employees may suffer similar fates because of subconscious race-based stereotyping. 
See, e.g., Gary Blasi, Advocacy Against the Stereotype: Lessons from Cognitive Social 
Psychology, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1241 (2002); R.A. Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark: Race, 
Stigma, and Equality in Context, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. _ (forthcoming 2004); see also Charles 
R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious 
Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987); Terry Smith, EverJtiay Indignities: Race, Retaliation, 
and the Promise of Title Vil, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 529 (2003). 
99. See Radford, supra note 71, at 507-13; see also Amy L. Wax, Discrimination by 
Accident, 74 IND. L.J. 1 129, 1169-76 (1999). 
100. See Taub, supra note 71, at 394-97. 
101. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2000). Compensatory and punitive damages are expressly 
limited to discriminatory-treatment cases. See id. § 1981a(2). 
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Title VII was to prohibit "not only overt discrimination but also 
practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation . . . .  
[G]ood intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem 
employment procedures . . .  that operate as 'built-in headwinds' " for 
protected groups. 102 If this lofty goal is to be achieved, courts must 
develop an intermediate proof construct that will diminish employer 
reliance upon factors that subconsciously reflect gender-based 
stereotyping. 
In her thoughtful article, Linda Hamilton Krieger suggested an 
approach that could be used to challenge employment decisions 
influenced by subconscious gender-based stereotypes. Instead of 
asking whether the decision maker consciously discriminated against 
someone because of her gender, courts should examine the seemingly 
gender-neutral standards relied upon and ask whether criteria 
reflecting subconscious gender-based expectations constituted 
"motivating factors" with respect to the decision in question. 103 She 
suggests that "it is reasonable to presume in such situations that the 
employer's decisionmaking was contaminated by cognitive sources of 
intergroup bias. "104 
Under the gender-biased "motivating-factor" approach, claimants 
would not have to prove conscious discrimination because of gender, 
nor would they have to establish statistically significant 
disproportionate impacts based on sex. They would instead have to 
demonstrate that the decisionmaking process was tainted by reliance 
upon factors influenced by subconscious gender-based stereotyping. 
Since intentional sex discrimination would not be shown, Krieger 
suggests that compensatory and punitive damages available for 
deliberate discrimination should not be awarded to claimants under 
the "motivating-factor" approach. 105 
Adoption of a motivating-factor proof construct would require 
claimants to establish that decisionmakers relied upon evaluative 
criteria reflecting subtle, gender-biased stereotypes. This would not be 
an easy standard to satisfy, especially with respect to holistic hiring 
and promotion procedures that do not evaluate candidates on a factor­
by-factor basis. Where evaluators consider various criteria and 
develop overall comparative assessments, rejected persons would have 
to use regression analyses or similar techniques to show that the 
challenged decisions were biased by subconscious gender-based 
expectations. While this approach would not eliminate all forms of 
102. 401 U.S. at 431-32. "Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of 
employment practices, not simply the motivation." Id. at 432. 
103. See Krieger, supra note 71, at 1241-44; see also Taub, supra note 71, at 397-407. 
104. See Krieger, supra note 71, at 1242. 
105. See id. at 1243. 
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gender stereotyping, it would encourage employers to carefully review 
their evaluation criteria and be aware of the factors that may reflect 
subtle gender biases.106 
CONCLUSION 
In Women Don't Ask, Babcock and Laschever have provided a 
well-researched and thoughtful analysis of the hesitancy of females to 
ask for more beneficial starting salaries and to believe they deserve to 
be paid as well as their male cohorts. This book should be of 
significant interest to students of the negotiation process, as well as to 
persons concerned about the lower compensation received by women 
and the capacity of the Equal Pay Act and Title VII to eliminate such 
differentials. Their research findings with respect to subtle gender­
biased stereotyping also raise challenging issues that do not fit within 
existing Title VII proof constructs. 
106. See Wax, supra note 99, at 1180-92. 
